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A B S T R A C T
This study seeks to understand whether the mainstream SRI leads to similar investment decisions in conventional
and SRI pension funds. The SRI is expanding beyond specialised SRI funds and increasingly conventional pension
funds are integrating firms with certain ESG criteria, in line with legitimacy-theory premises. This phenomenon
raises the questions whether SRI and conventional portfolios are converging and whether SRI funds preserve
their ethical essence. Using fund holdings and ESG-stock scores, we examine the inclusion level of ESG firms
by UK conventional and SRI domestic equity pension funds, taking into account the investment in controversial
(socially-sensitive) firms (i.e. related to tobacco, alcohol, or gambling industries, among others). We find that
conventional funds consider the firms in which SRI funds invest to integrate ESG criteria. Nonetheless, SRI funds
maintain larger ESG-firm standards, preserving the ethical purpose, and larger ESG standards in SRI funds do not
affect performance. Our results also show that the ESG integration into conventional funds evolves over time.
© 2021
1. Introduction
The Socially Responsible Investment (SRI) has experienced unprece-
dented development among fund-industries in the last decade. This ex-
pansion is due to the progress of specialised SRI funds and the inclu-
sion of ESG (Environmental, Social, and Governance) criteria by con-
ventional funds. Portfolio managers are increasingly developing strate-
gies to also consider non-financial factors, aligning diverse clients' cor-
porate-sustainability values (Nath 2020). The growing awareness of
ESG-firm issues, such as environmental scandals or corporate miscon-
ducts, has changed investors’ conducts towards sustainable investing,
transforming the global financial industry (Matallín-Sáez et al.,
2019). More and more investors look for firms concerned about the im-
pact of corporate activities, selecting firms involved in cleaner produc-
tion methods, renewable energies, environmental-responsible technolo-
gies, or socially-friendly activities, among others (Jin and Han 2018;
Silva and Cortez 2016).
This pressure is making funds aware that ignoring these concerns
increases the risk of losing legitimacy (Suchman 1995). Thus, in line
with legitimacy-theory principles (Suchman 1995), an increasing num-
ber of conventional funds are including investors’ concerns and
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modifying investment behaviours with the inclusion of ESG-investment
criteria. Martí-Ballester (2015) argues that this behaviour may reach
similar performance to traditional strategies because investee-fund firms
have improved ESG-production processes. In this context, conventional
investment-management theories, such as modern portfolio theory, do
not fully explain investment conducts based on non-financial factors.
Several studies point out that the ESG inclusion may be creating a con-
vergence between the SRI and the traditional management, evolving
from a SRI niche to a mainstream SRI (Hellsten and Mallin 2006;
Revelli 2017).
Specifically, the SRI niche is based on the selection of ESG assets
causing management constraints; however, the mainstream SRI pur-
sues to integrate the ESG dimension into conventional management
(Azoulay and Zeller 2006; Revelli 2017). Under the mainstream-SRI
framework, SRI funds might not apply too restrictive ESG standards,
SRI-information costs may decrease, and performance may improve
(Barnett and Salomon 2006; Gangi and Varrrone 2018). Neverthe-
less, this mainstream may produce SRI ambiguities whether SRI bound-
aries become fuzzy due to a large variety of ESG standards (Nath 2020).
This conduct raises the concern about the real ethics of SRI funds (Hell-
sten and Mallin 2006), revealing the need to analyse whether SRI
funds follow SRI-niche tenets or are moving towards the mainstream
SRI, prejudicing their ethical standards.
On the other hand, the SRI integration into conventional funds has
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the growing demand to report investments' impact, legislation changes,
and the willing to restore their damaged legitimacy during the last finan-
cial crisis (In et al., 2014; Joliet and Titova 2018; UNEP FI 2009).
Consistent with the framework of legitimacy theory, conventional funds
including ESG criteria are fulfilling the social contract that allows the
reconnaissance of their purposes, continuing to use social resources, and
their survival (Deegan 2002; Lindblom 1994; Schiopoiu and Popa
2013). Thus, the SRI integration may produce the ethicalisation of in-
vestment processes, aligning portfolio-construction plans between SRI
and conventional funds (Hoepner and Schopohl 2020). Nevertheless,
the specific ESG goals of conventional funds depend on managers’ pri-
orities to weigh economic and ideological motives (McLachlan and
Gardner 2004), which may create ambiguous ESG standards. Conse-
quently, it is necessary to analyse the ESG standards of conventional and
SRI portfolios, clarifying whether conventional funds are learning from
SRI portfolios or develop own ESG-investment strategies.
The SRI-integration phenomenon is especially expanded among pen-
sion funds due to their pro-social behaviour, long-term investment na-
ture, management of large retirement savings, or their high political pro-
file (Sandberg 2013; Sievänen et al., 2017). Pension funds own more
than a quarter of global listed stocks, representing 25% of the organi-
zations accountable for main sustainable development matters (Hoep-
ner and Schopohl 2020). In addition, pension funds are more norm
constrained than other institutional investors due to the larger exposure
to scrutiny, reinforcing the ESG integration (Hong and Kacperczyk
2009). On the other hand, the long-term investment and the signifi-
cant equity holdings make pension funds vulnerable to long-term risks.
The ESG-investment criteria may help to manage these risks because
ESG factors are long-term risk-management indicators (Hoepner and
Schopohl 2020). Sethi (2005) finds that pension funds take long-term
risks more earnestly due to their commitments to beneficiaries, promot-
ing a more sustainable economy by engaging in responsible investment.
SRI policies among pension funds have increased globally. The UK is
one of the pioneers on regulating the ESG disclosure in pension funds
(UKSIF 2018). The UK possesses the second largest pension-fund in-
dustry with USD 3.6 trillion, representing 7.3% of OECD pension assets
(OECD 2020). Nevertheless, SRI studies on pension funds are scarce
(Sandberg 2013; Siëvannen et al., 2017; among others), and no prior
works (as far as we know) analyse the mainstream-SRI phenomenon in
pension funds, considering legitimacy lens.
This paper contributes to fill the existent gap in the pension-fund lit-
erature by analysing whether the mainstream SRI produces a conver-
gence between SRI and conventional pension funds towards firms with
similar ESG strategies. Our analyses also help to understand the drivers
of incorporating non-financial criteria into investment decisions, consid-
ering legitimacy-theory bases. The rest of the paper proceeds as follows.
Section “Literature Review” provides an overview of existing literature.
Section “Data and Method” describes the data and the methodology.
Section “Findings and discussion” contains the results. Section “Conclu-
sions” shows the main conclusions.
2. Literature review
The pension-fund management is traditionally explained by mod-
ern-portfolio principles. However, the inclusion of non-financial crite-
ria responds to other frameworks, such as legitimacy theory. Under
the modern-portfolio theory, fund managers select assets under prin-
ciples of return maximization, risk minimization, and diversification
(Markowitz 1952). Nonetheless, society's norms, values, and beliefs
evolve, and managers should adapt investments to these preferences for
survival and competitive reasons (Schiopoiu and Popa 2013). The le-
gitimacy theory indicates that, when managers perceive a legitimacy
gap, they develop strategies to correct their behaviour and realign with
societal desires (Lindblom 1994). Consistent with this premise, the
mainstream SRI grows the demand of ESG-investment criteria and, ac-
cordingly, funds are increasingly including these criteria.
Despite this change, funds may still build optimal portfolios accord-
ing to modern-portfolio theory because the legitimacy-theory sustain-
ability is based on managing the connections between traditional norms
and modern ethics (Schiopoiu and Popa 2013). Deegan (2002) pos-
tulates that the interests of companies and society are both joined by
financial issues and contracts. Hence, ESG managerial-investment strate-
gies can maintain and create congruence between funds’ social values
and societal values. Furthermore, the legitimacy notion to compliance
with the social contract may be enhanced in pension funds, given their
social nature (Deegan 2002; Sievänen et al., 2017).
Wirth regard to SRI funds, they usually follow SRI-niche tenets by
carefully selecting firms with corporate-sustainability business policies.
Moreover, SRI funds effort to include financial practices (finance inte-
grates within ethics). In contrast, the mainstream SRI of conventional
funds includes ethics within finance (Revelli 2017). This behaviour
may lead conventional funds to construct more alike portfolios with
regard to SRI funds. Whether SRI and conventional portfolios become
more homogeneous, the demand of SRI firms will increase, raising prices
and performance (In et al., 2014). Additionally, whether conventional
and SRI funds compete in the same market, the market competition will
increase, and their differentiation can diminish.
Despite prior arguments, the SRI niche is still growing and SRI funds
may desire to preserve their identity by offering differentiate products,
investing in companies enhancing corporate sustainability, and effec-
tively balancing the economic and ESG strategies through innovative
or cleaner production methods, among others. In et al. (2014) find
that SRI funds only compete with other SRI funds due to their unique
nature. SRI funds explicitly declare their socially responsible purposes,
supplying specialised products to a niche with specific values. On the
other hand, conventional funds should account for the diverse value
preferences of major clients and financial profitability (Nath 2020).
Hence, SRI and conventional funds would not market identical products
and SRI-fund managers would maintain the distinctive identity (Nath
2020).
Considering the aforementioned evidence, we hypothesise:
Hypothesis 1 The mainstream-SRI expansion has increased ESG con-
ventional-fund scores due to larger portfolio-holding similarities with re-
gard to SRI portfolios.
Hypothesis 2 SRI funds maintain higher ESG standards due to SRI
specialization and differentiation.
Despite the SRI integration into the conventional-fund segment,
Sievänen (2014) identifies obstacles to implement SRI policies (uncer-
tain financial consequences, agency problems, or absence of accepted
ESG guidelines). Accordingly, the ESG-screening intensity may diversely
affect performance (Gangi and Varrrone 2018). In this regard, con-
ventional investors may not be willing to sacrifice financial benefits
whether superior ESG standards increase screening costs, reduce in-
vestment opportunities, and negatively affect performance (Aslaksen
and Synnestwedt 2003). Borgers et al. (2015) point out that con-
ventional funds may offset these losses by building mixed portfolios
with superior ESG assets and controversial assets (i.e. socially-sensitive
stocks)1 due to the superior risk-adjusted return of controversial as-
sets (Hong and Kacperczyk 2009). This conduct may be explained
by the perception risk of legitimacy theory (Deegan 2019); specif-
ically, there is a perception that legitimacy simply manipulates
1 Controversial assets, also called “sin stocks” or “socially-sensitive stocks”, include to-
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opinion, instead of developing actual management changes. Thus, con-
ventional managers may expect that the SRI inclusion is enough to ful-
fil their social contract. Despite this perception, this behaviour may
counteract the legitimacy obtained, and funds should manage it (Ash-
forth and Gibbs 1990). For example, some conventional funds avoid
socially-sensitive stocks because of social considerations, lower arbi-
trage possibilities, or pricing errors (Borgers et al., 2015; Hong and
Kacperczyk 2009; Perez 2016). On the other hand, Nath (2020)
finds that some conventional funds limit exposure to exclusionary indus-
tries instead of excluding them. Considering previous arguments, we hy-
pothesise:
Hypothesis 3 Larger ESG-portfolio similarities between conventional
and SRI funds decrease conventional funds' performance.
Hypothesis 4 Conventional funds use socially-sensitive stocks to offset
performance losses caused by ESG constraints.
3. Data and method
3.1. Data
Our sample is drawn from several sources. The pension-fund data
are obtained from Morningstar Direct. We select all UK domestic equity
pension funds from January 1999 to November 2019. We identify SRI
funds with the “Socially Conscious” Morningstar label (a dichotomous
variable -Yes/No-, indicating if a fund is a SRI fund). The data include
the daily return, monthly return, monthly Total Net Assets (TNAs), in-
ception-fund date, annual turnover ratios, annual expense ratios, and
quarterly portfolio holdings (weights invested in each asset). We exclude
index funds for robustness and include live and dead funds to avoid
survivorship bias. Pension funds have at least 75% of their holdings in
stocks. The holdings of funds with multiple share classes are common,
thus, we aggregate share classes at portfolio level to eliminate dupli-
cates, calculating weighted average return, turnover, and expense ratios,
and aggregating the total TNAs of all fund share classes. With regard to
funds’ qualitative attributes (name, inception date), we keep the class
with the longest history (Joliet and Titova 2018). The resulting sam-
ple is formed by 359 pension funds (331 conventional and 28 SRI funds).
These funds invest in 4697 distinct stocks over the period studied. From
the fund-inception date, we obtain the fund age. The fund performance
is the monthly four-factor alpha of Carhart (1997),2 estimated with
36-month return rolling windows. Hence, the analysis period is: January
2002–November 2019.
On the other hand, we obtain quarterly ESG-firm scores of the 4697
stocks from Datastream database. The ESG scoring is the ESG over-
all-company score obtained by Refinitiv, based on firms’ publicly-re-
ported information in the ESG-firm pillars, divided into 10 categories:
three environmental (resource use, emissions, and innovation), four so-
cial (workforce, human rights, community, and product responsibility),
and three governance categories (management, shareholders, and CSR
strategy). The ESG score is a weighted average of the underlying 10 cate-
gory scores, ranging from 0 (lowest) to 1 (highest).3 Finally, the monthly
OECD-based recession indicator (0/1) for the UK is from the Federal Re-
serve Economic Data4 to detect recessions (1) and expansions (0).
2 The risk factors are the European factors from French's website: https://mba.tuck.
dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html.




First, we calculate the ESG-fund score, following previous literature
(Borgers et al., 2015). We match the quarterly portfolio holdings from
Morningstar with the quarterly ESG-firm scores from Datastream. We
calculate quarterly ESG-fund scores as the asset-weighted sum of the
quarterly ESG-stock scores and the fund weights of all stocks held by
each fund:
(1)
Where: ESGfund_scorei,t is the ESG score of fund i at quarter t, is the
weight of stock j in fund i at quarter t, ESGj,t is the ESG score of stock j
at quarter t.
Although portfolio holdings are quarterly, we transform quarterly
variables into monthly variables because most of our variables are
monthly. Following Brown et al. (2015), we use the data of the pre-
vious quarter as monthly proxy (the data of a quarter is applied for the
three months included in the next quarter).
Second, we calculate two overlap portfolio measures to analyse port-
folio similarities. The first measure shows the quarterly average percent-
age of common stocks between a conventional (SRI) fund and all SRI
(conventional) funds (measure 3). To calculate measure (3), first, we
compute measure (2), comparing the quarterly portfolio holdings of con-
ventional (SRI) funds with the portfolio holdings of SRI (conventional)
funds by pairs.
(2)
Where: is the overlap ratio between funds i and j at quar-
ter t. When we compare a conventional (SRI) fund with all SRI (conven-
tional) funds, fund i is each conventional (SRI) fund analysed and fund
j is all possible SRI (conventional) fund pairs. is the total num-
ber of common stocks between funds i and j at quarter t. Ni,t is the total
number of stocks held by fund i at quarter t.
The total overlap ratio of fund i at quarter t is the average of all
fund pairs of fund i:
(3)
Where: Overlap_ratioi,t is the portfolio-similarity measure showing the
percentage of common stocks of conventional (SRI) fund i at quarter t
with all SRI (conventional) portfolios analysed. Mi,t is the total possible
fund pairs of conventional (SRI) fund i with all SRI (conventional) funds
at quarter t.
Measure (3) shows portfolio similarities in aggregate terms, focusing
on common assets. However, SRI and conventional funds may invest dif-
ferent portfolio weights in common stocks, depending on the ESG-stock
score. Measure (5) controls the portfolio similarity considering the asset
weight and the ESG-stock score. Nonetheless, first, we calculate measure
(4) by fund pairs.
(4)
Where: is the ESG-score overlap ratio between funds
i and j at quarter t. When we compare a conventional (SRI) fund with
all SRI (conventional) funds, fund i is each conventional (SRI) fund
analysed and fund j is all possible SRI (conventional) fund pairs with
fund i at quarter t. and are the fund weights invested in stock
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of stock n at quarter t, and N is the total stocks held by fund i at quarter
t.
The total ESG-overlap ratio of fund i at quarter t (measure 5) shows
the portfolio similarity considering stocks’ weights and ESG scores with
regard to their peers.
(5)
Measures (3) and (5) are the dependent variables to study portfo-
lio-similarity drivers. The main independent variables considered as po-
tential drivers are the fund nature (SRI/conventional) and the ESG-fund
score. The fund nature is measured with the SRI_dummyit (1/0 when fund
i is/is not a SRI fund). A negative dummy will indicate that SRI funds
maintain the expected product differentiation. Conversely, whether con-
ventional funds are improving ESG standards, we expect larger overlap
with greater ESG-fund scores.
On the other hand, when we determine the portfolio-similarity im-
pact on ESG-fund scores and performance, measures (3) and (5) are in-
dependent variables, and ESG-fund scores and alpha are dependent vari-
ables.
The control variables in all models are representative of the main
fund characteristics: return, size (TNAs), age, trading activity
(turnover-ratio), costs (expense-ratio), and portfolio concentration. The
economic phase is also a control variable. Joliet and Titova (2018)
find that SRI funds better endure crises; thus, we may expect higher
portfolio similarities during crises. The inclusion of some control vari-
ables deserves further explanation. The turnover ratio controls for trad-
ing because building similar portfolios may imply following others' trad-
ing. With regard to the expense ratio, SRI requires additional screen-
ing information, increasing expense ratios; however, whether a manager
follows others’ decisions, information costs may decrease. Addition-
ally, SRI funds may build under-diversified portfolios due to the limited
ESG-investment universe (Aslaksen and Synnestwedt 2003; Barnett
and Solomon 2006). Whether SRI and conventional funds considering
ESG criteria invest in a reduced universe and develop more alike port-
folios, they may build more concentrated portfolios. We calculate port-
folio concentration with the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (Hirschman
1964).
(6)
Where: HHIi,t is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of fund i at quarter t,
is the weight of stock j in fund i at quarter t, and N are the total stocks
held by fund i at quarter t. HHI varies between 0 and 1.
3.3. Model specification
To examine portfolio-similarity drivers and the portfolio-similarity
effect on ESG-fund scores and performance, we estimate a set of panel
regressions with robust standard errors clustered by fund and time
(month) to address heteroskedasticity and correlated error terms. The
first estimations include overlap measures (3) and (5) as dependent vari-
ables, and the independent and control variables are those described in
Section “Variables”. Subsequently, we study the influence of portfolio
similarities on ESG-fund scores and performance. The independent vari-
ables are overlap measures (3) or/and (5) and the aforementioned con-
trol variables. All independent variables are lagged to avoid endogeneity
issues and capture that portfolio-holding decisions and fund results are
commonly based on the most recent information; i.e. the previous pe-
riod (Anantharaman and Lee 2014).
Our analyses are divided into two parts. First, we analyse all funds
(359) to consider the UK domestic-equity universe of pension funds.
However, due to size differences between conventional and SRI sam-
ples, we apply the nearest-neighbour matching to select matched con-
ventional funds and avoid biases (Bilbao-Terol et al., 2017; Joliet
and Titova 2018). The method matches the control individuals (con-
ventional funds) to the treated group (SRI) with the smallest distance
between them on fund characteristics, discarding non-matched control
individuals. The propensity score is the similarity measure between
funds, estimated with logistic regression on fund characteristics. We use
Stata/SE12.0 software to perform the nearest-neighbour matching5 and
the regressions.6 Fig. 1 displays the workflow scheme of the research
processes and methods.
4. Findings and discussion
4.1. Summary statistics
Panel A of Table 1 shows that SRI funds display significantly higher
performance, lower size, lower age, higher turnover, lower expenses,
higher ESG-fund scores, and lower portfolio similarities (overlap and ES-
G_overlap ratios). These SRI-fund characteristics are consistent with the
SRI-niche tenets. The lower overlaps suggest that SRI funds are not mov-
ing away from the ethical purpose and conventional and SRI funds con-
tinue building distinct portfolios. Panel B shows that SRI and conven-
tional funds hold controversial stocks (highlighting tobacco), although
SRI funds hold lower weights. This conduct may be related to finan-
cial outcomes, looking for profits and offsetting ESG limitations. Bar-
nett and Salomon (2006) and Gangi and Varrone (2018) find that
SRI funds reduced the ESG standards to achieve similar performance to
conventional-fund performance. Nath (2020) points out that the SRI
expansion has led to multiple SRI-fund categorization and SRI funds can
hold hundreds of holdings with different position on the ESG spectrum.
Panel C compares conventional and SRI fund investments considering
investee-firms’ sectors (according to Morningstar-database sector clas-
sification). Both funds develop similar investment patterns. The three
main sectors are consumer cyclical, financial services and industrials,
while the residual sectors are real estate and utilities. Nevertheless, con-
ventional funds present larger investments in consumer defensive (i.e.
foods, beverages or tobacco) and energy (coal and mining) industries,
supporting greater controversial-stock investments.
4.2. ESG-similarity drivers
Panel A of Table 2 shows that SRI funds present lower portfolio
similarities with regard to conventional portfolios (SRI_dummy), hold-
ing a lower number of common stocks. Hence, conventional funds con-
sider SRI-fund holdings to a greater extent than SRI funds focus on con-
ventional-fund holdings. This is consistent with the SRI integration into
conventional funds. Additionally, funds with larger ESG scores present
higher portfolio similarities (significantly positive ESG), given that the
limited ESG-asset universe narrows with further ESG standards. Panel B
indicate that conventional funds consider weights and ESG-stock scores
of SRI funds to a greater extent than SRI funds focus on conventional
portfolios (negative SRI_dummy). Furthermore, conventional funds with
larger similarities on weights and ESG scores present higher ESG scores,
lower size, lower turnover, lower expense ratios, and increase simi-
larities during crises. Therefore, conventional funds integrating related
ESG strategies to SRI funds develop steadier investment behaviour,
consistent with long-term sustainable investments (Joliet and Titova
2018). Furthermore, conventional funds are increasingly interested in
5 The nearest-neighbour matching Stata command used is: “psmatch2”.
6 The Stata commands of OLS regressions are: “reg” with “robust” and “cluster” options,
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Fig. 1. Research workflow scheme.
Table 1
Summary statistics. Table 1 is divided into three panels. Panel A shows summary statistics
of the monthly variables for all, conventional, and SRI funds. The last column shows the
differences between conventional-fund and SRI-fund variables. The significance levels of
the differences in means are based on t-tests. *** indicates significance at 1% level. Panel
B shows the portfolio holdings in controversial stocks. Panel C shows the fund investments
by investee-stock sector (%).
Panel A: Fund variables
All Conventional SRI Difference
Alpha 0.00133 0.0013 0.0018 −0.0006***
Return 0.00565 0.0057 0.0054 0.0003
Size 70.5*10 6 72.5*10 6 49.4*10 6 23.1*10 6***
Age 10.54562 10.7008 9.0822 1.6186***
Turnover_ratio 0.87755 0.863 1.0087 −0.1457***
Expense_ratio 0.01472 0.0148 0.0135 0.0013***
ESG-fund_score 0.3714 0.3691 0.3906 −0.0215***
HHI 0.06277 0.0673 0.0222 0.0451
Overlap_ratio 0.15025 0.1531 0.1226 0.0305***
ESG-overlap_ratio 0.74742 0.802 0.2367 0.5653***
Panel B: Controversial-stock holdings
Tobacco 2.97% 3.14% 1.15%
Gambling 0.49% 0.52% 0.17%
Alcohol 0.62% 0.64% 0.46%
Panel C: Fund investments: Stock-portfolio holdings by stock sector




Consumer Cyclical 14.92% 14.73% 17.02%
Consumer Defensive 9.39% 9.62% 6.91%
Energy 10.27% 10.58% 6.91%
Financial Services 17.64% 17.33% 20.94%
Healthcare 7.93% 7.99% 7.36%
Industrials 15.67% 15.78% 14.49%
Real Estate 2.59% 2.59% 2.56%
Technology 5.71% 5.68% 6.00%
Utilities 3.48% 3.37% 4.70%
integrating ESG criteria and not only pretending it (consistent with
substantive legitimacy-theory strategies, Silva 2021). On the contrary,
SRI funds with higher ESG-overlap ratios possess some frequent con-
ventional-fund characteristics, presenting greater age, higher turnover,
larger expense ratios, and lower portfolio concentration. Finally, the
average variance inflation factors (VIFs) do not show multicollinearity
problems (VIFs less than two).7
4.3. The influence of ESG-fund similarities
We study whether increasing portfolio similarities is a strategy to in-
corporate the SRI into traditional management, rising (decreasing) the
ESG-fund level of conventional (SRI) funds. Table 3 shows that greater
overlap ratios (measures 3 and 5) increase ESG-fund scores (columns
2–4). Hence, commonalities between SRI and conventional funds are
based on superior ESG stocks, confirming the SRI integration into con-
ventional funds. Furthermore, SRI funds achieve higher ESG-fund scores
(significantly positive SRI_dummy), showing that SRI funds maintain su-
perior ethical standards. This evidence is consistent with Hypotheses
1–2.
Regarding the influence of portfolio-similarities on performance,
Table 4 shows that the SRI fund nature does not affect performance
(non-significant SRI_dummy). The positive influence of the ESG-fund
score (column 1) disappears when overlap measures are included.
Columns (2) and (4) show that greater common stocks between con-
ventional and SRI funds improve performance (positive Overlap), con-
sistent with the pressure on prices produced by the larger demand of
ESG stocks (In et al., 2014). However, the negative ESG coefficient
in columns (2) and (4) shows that demanding superior ESG standards
constraint investment possibilities (Azoulay and Zeller 2006; Revelli
2017). Whether similarities are based on stock weights and ESG scores,
performance is also negatively affected (significantly negative ESG_over-
lap in columns 3 and 4). These results are in line with the SRI-niche prin-
ciples; that is, larger ESG-fund standards and higher demand of superior
ESG stocks narrow the limited ESG universe, negatively affecting perfor-
mance (Revelli 2017).
Consistent with Hypothesis 3, column (5) shows that conventional
funds with greater ESG-fund scores present lower performance. Addi-
tionally, conventional funds with more common stocks with SRI port-
folios outperform (positive Overlap). Nevertheless, conventional funds
developing similar strategies to SRI funds regarding weights and
ESG-scores possess lower performance (ESG_overlap). Although previous
7 The VIFs of all models developed in this paper are largely lower than 10, a thresh-
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Table 2
Fund-similarity drivers. Table 2 shows the estimation results with overlap ratios (3) and (5) as dependent variables in panels A and B, respectively. All models are estimated with OLS,
robust standard errors and clustered by fund and month. T-statistics are in parenthesis. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Panel A: Overlap-ratio drivers Panel B: ESG-overlap ratio drivers
All Conventional SRI All Conventional SRI
SRI_dummyt −0.0059*** −0.0628***
(-2.62) (-7.61)
ESGt-1 0.3616*** 0.3707*** 0.1766*** 0.7107*** 0.7322*** 0.7343***
(42.36) (42.4) (8.75) (18.29) (21.14) (14.89)
Returnt-1 0.0327** 0.0316** 0.0046 −0.0603 −0.0537 −0.0576
(2.35) (2.13) (0.21) (-1.17) (-0.97) (-1.09)
Sizet-1 −0.0002*** −0.0002*** 0.0002 −0.0002*** −0.0002*** −0.0008
(-14.86) (-14.46) (1.06) (-4.67) (-4.37) (-1.57)
Aget-1 0.0022*** 0.0025*** 0.0002 0.0005 −0.0003 −0.0034**
(8.51) (9.22) (0.36) (0.58) (-0.37) (-2.57)
Turnovert-1 −0.001 0.0026* −0.0061*** −0.0093*** −0.0126*** 0.0057***
(-0.91) (1.77) (-6.16) (-3.34) (-3.64) (2.81)
Expense t-1 0.023*** 0.0212*** 0.0663*** −0.127*** −0.14*** 0.1517***
(8.34) (7.54) (5.82) (-9.48) (-10.09) (4.17)
HHIt-1 0.3886*** 0.3973*** 0.5348* −0.264 −0.0835 −0.2733***
(2.85) (2.91) (1.82) (-0.3) (-0.11) (-15)
Crisist-1 −0.0167*** −0.0187*** −0.0145*** 0.0298*** 0.032*** 0.0339***
(-8.59) (-9.04) (-5.18) (4.77) (4.78) (4.27)
Constantt 0.1258*** 0.1112*** 0.3847*** −0.4244*** −0.4868*** −0.3765**
(9.7) (8.34) (8.46) (-6.82) (-7.76) (-2.36)
R 2 0.3894 0.6405 0.4736 0.39 0.4109 0.6907
VIF 1.09 1.07 1.79 1.09 1.08 1.81
Table 3
Similarity-influence on ESG-fund score. Table 3 shows the estimation results for all funds
with ESG-fund score (1) as dependent variable. All models are estimated with OLS, robust
standard errors and clustered by fund and month. T-statistics are in parenthesis. *, **, and
*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SRI_dummyt 0.0123** 0.0154*** 0.0346*** 0.0275***
(2.12) (3.15) (5.78) (5.55)
Overlap_ratiot-1 1.5193*** 1.2679***
(44.68) (36.87)
ESG_overlap t-1 0.4292*** 0.2178***
(21.57) (15.39)
Return t-1 −0.039 −0.0552* −0.0109 −0.0366
(-0.75) (-1.79) (-0.26) (-1.31)
Sizet-1 0.0002*** 0.0004*** 0.0002*** 0.0004***
(5.61) (11.68) (6.01) (10.99)
Aget-1 0.0011 −0.0029*** 0.0007 −0.0023***
(1.23) (-5.25) (1.03) (-5)
Turnovert-1 0.0106*** 0.0065*** 0.0125*** 0.0078***
(5.12) (3.27) (6.09) (4.14)
Expense_ratiot-1 −0.0383*** −0.0533*** 0.0265*** −0.0188***
(-7.41) (-11.9) (4.01) (-4.2)
Crisist-1 −0.0291*** 0.0119*** −0.0322*** 0.0052
(-5.05) (2.95) (-6.71) (1.4)
Constantt 0.213*** −0.1106*** 0.3268*** −0.0052
(9.01) (-5.24) (11.66) (-0.26)
R 2 0.0347 0.5817 0.3299 0.6417
VIF 1.07 1.09 1.10 1.17
studies find that ESG-integration strategies are less stringent (Revelli
2017), our results show that conventional funds face SRI-integration dif-
ficulties. Thus, imitating SRI strategies does not fully incorporate ethics
in finance, and conventional funds also need to manage the SRI fac-
tor. Column (6) shows that the performance of SRI funds is not af-
fected by the ESG-fund score and the ESG_overlap ratio. However, larger
common-stock overlap improves performance. These results are consis-
tent with the lower portfolio imitation of SRI funds.
4.4. Controversial stocks’ influence
Table 1 shows that conventional and SRI funds hold controversial
stocks, although weights are not large. Conventional funds may main-
tain these stocks to offset the financial penalty of superior ESG stan-
dards, as we found in Table 4. However, holding these sensitive stocks
by SRI funds may discredit their ethics. Consistent with mainstream-SRI
detractors, it seems necessary to question whether the bankable of ethics
leads to forget the aim of SRI funds, based on excluding investments
deemed unethical (Revelli 2017).
Table 5 shows that larger holdings on tobacco/alcohol firms im-
prove/reduce conventional-funds’ performance. In line with Hypothe-
sis 4, these stocks can offset financial penalties due to ESG constraints
in conventional funds. Nevertheless, our evidence is limited to support
Hypothesis 4. Alternatively, larger tobacco/gambling holdings in SRI
funds increase/reduce performance, showing the negative effect of di-
verting from their ethical purposes. Novethic (2010) indicates that
combining ESG-integration and SRI may increase the risk of false adver-
tising, misrepresenting the ESG practices applied. Thus, it is necessary
to maintain rigorous structured SRI funds since, in general, we find that
SRI funds apply additional ESG screenings.
4.5. Robustness tests
4.5.1. Sub-period analysis
In this section we study whether results vary due to the main-
stream-SRI evolution. Our overlap ratios show two trends, increasing
from 2004 to 2012 and decreasing from 2013 to 2019. We separate the
sample in these sub-periods and repeat prior analyses. Panels A and B
of Table 6 confirm that SRI funds present lower portfolio similarities.
Higher ESG scores increase portfolio similarities of conventional and
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Table 4
Similarity-influence on performance. Table 4 shows the estimation results with alpha as dependent variable for all (estimations 1–4), conventional (estimation 5), and SRI funds (estima-
tion 6). All models are estimated with OLS, robust standard errors and clustered by fund and month. T-statistics are in parenthesis. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and
1% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)Conventional (6)SRI
SRI_dummyt 0.0001 0.0005 0.0000 0.0003
(0.41) (1.54) (0.06) (0.9)
ESGt-1 0.003*** −0.0055*** 0.0072*** −0.0028* −0.0044*** −0.0005
(3.37) (-4.15) (7.49) (-1.95) (-2.97) (-0.11)
Overlap t-1 0.0264*** 0.0273*** 0.0297*** 0.0484***
(9.68) (10.07) (10.68) (4.5)
ESG_overlapt-1 −0.0045*** −0.0047*** −0.0044*** 0.0006
(-5.98) (-6.55) (-5.62) (0.13)
Returnt-1 −0.002 −0.0026 −0.002 −0.0026 −0.0021 −0.0059
(-1.04) (-1.38) (-1.03) (-1.37) (-1.03) (-1.43)
Sizet-1 0.000 0.0001** 0.0000 0.0001** 0.0001* 0.0001***
(-1.23) (2.23) (-1.26) (2.07) (1.68) (3.13)
Aget-1 0.0004*** 0.0003*** 0.0004*** 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 0.0008***
(11.75) (9.34) (11.76) (9.34) (7.74) (9.39)
Turnovert-1 −0.0006*** −0.0006*** −0.0007*** −0.0006*** −0.001*** 0.0001
(-5.98) (-5.75) (-6.43) (-5.79) (-7.52) (0.62)
Expense_ratiot-1 −0.0869** −0.1995*** −0.1626*** −0.2815*** −0.2501*** −0.7826***
(-2.26) (-4.84) (-3.71) (-6.53) (-5.28) (-6.4)
Crisist-1 −0.0051*** −0.0046*** −0.0049*** −0.0044*** −0.0044*** −0.0027***
(-21.08) (-18.75) (-19.65) (-17.99) (-16.88) (-4.6)
Constantt 0.0008 0.0012 0.0019** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.0002
(1.02) (1.51) (2.11) (3.54) (3.25) (0.09)
R 2 0.2926 0.3328 0.3106 0.3462 0.3481 0.6132
VIF 1.08 1.47 1.20 1.53 1.60 1.89
Table 5
Controversial-sector stocks’ influence on performance. Table 5 shows the results includ-
ing controversial-sector holdings as independent variables to analyse their influence on
alpha for all, conventional, and SRI funds. All models are estimated with OLS, robust stan-
dard errors and clustered by fund and month. Control-variable results are not displayed
and available upon request. T-statistics are in parenthesis. *, **, and *** indicate signifi-




ESGt-1 0.0023** 0.002** 0.0087**
(2.28) (1.97) (2.25)
Tobaccot-1 0.0105*** 0.0088*** 0.0225**
(3.36) (2.72) (2.05)
Gamblingt-1 0.0215 0.0207 −0.1722**
(1.3) (1.24) (-2.31)
Alcoholt-1 −0.0287*** −0.0318*** −0.0077
(-3.8) (-3.8) (-0.46)
Constantt 0.0014 0.0011 0.0025
(1.55) (1.17) (1.02)
R 2 0.2847 0.2827 0.5912
VIF 1.14 1.13 2.18
(negatively influence) conventional (SRI) funds in the second period, in-
dicating that funds are modifying their conducts. Conventional funds
initially integrated ESG practices by benchmarking SRI funds (positive
ESG-coefficient in the first period). However, conventional funds with
larger ESG scores reduce the SRI-portfolio imitation in the second pe-
riod, probably because the previous experience allows them to develop
their own ESG management. On the contrary, conventional funds with
poorer ESG scores consider SRI portfolios to learn about ESG assets. SRI
funds with superior ESG standards also move away from conventional
portfolios in the second period, developing distinct strategies.
Panel C shows that SRI funds present larger ESG scores in the first
period. A higher Overlap_ratio increases ESG scores of conventional and
SRI funds in both periods. However, greater ESG_overlap positively/neg-
atively influence ESG scores in the first/second period. This supports a
change in the ESG-investment trend during the second period; i.e., con-
ventional and SRI funds applying superior ESG strategies are evolving in
the ESG-integration and SRI-preservation, respectively, developing con-
sistent strategies with their nature.
Panel A of Table 7 shows that the SRI-fund nature does not signif-
icantly influence performance, consistent with Table 4. Panel B shows
that conventional funds with higher ESG scores achieve lower perfor-
mance in both periods, indicating that conventional funds with su-
perior ESG integration approximate to the SRI-niche principles (espe-
cially since 2013), based on the selection of ESG assets causing man-
agement constraints (Azoulay and Zeller 2006; Revelli 2017). Re-
garding overlap measures, in the first period, conventional funds with
more common stocks improve performance, but increasing ESG_overlap
similarities decreases performance. Panel C does not display significant
ESG-score influence on SRI-fund performance, and a greater Overlap_ra-
tio improves/deteriorates performance in the first/second period. This
suggests that SRI funds return to SRI-niche principles in the second pe-
riod, preserving their ethical purposes, although the mainstream-SRI has
filled the conventional management through ESG-integration.
4.5.2. Nearest-neighbour matching
We apply the nearest-neighbour matching process to provide a more
balance conventional-fund sample. The process provides 28 matched
conventional funds (the SRI sample is formed of 28 funds). Fig. 2
shows the better balance of the matched variables with regard to un-
matched variables. We repeat previous analyses to determine the ro-
bustness of the results. The results of Table A.1 in the Appendix show
that our main conclusions hold. Table 8 compares previous and cur-
rent results and displays three significant differences. Panels A.1 and
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Table 6
Fund-similarity drivers and influence on ESG-fund score by period. Table 6 shows the estimation results with overlap ratio (panel A), ESG-overlap ratio (panel B), and ESG-fund score
(panel C) as dependent variables for all, conventional, and SRI funds from 2002 to 2012 (1st period) and from 2013 to 2019 (2nd period). Control-variable results are not displayed and
available upon request. T-statistics are in parenthesis. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Panel A: Overlap ratio
All Conventional SRI
1 stperiod 2 ndperiod 1 stperiod 2 ndperiod 1 stperiod 2 ndperiod
SRI_dummyt −0.0057** −0.0381**
(-2.53) (-2.13)
ESGt-1 0.362*** −0.1162 0.3714*** 0.032 0.1774*** −0.092**
(43.41) (-0.8) (43.49) (0.16) (8.79) (-2.41)
Control_variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R 2 0.6173 0.971 0.6363 0.9718 0.4758 0.8936
VIF 1.08 2.01 1.07 1.57 1.79 1.70
Panel B: ESG-overlap ratio
SRI_dummyt −0.0607*** −0.2198***
(-7.46) (-2.69)
ESGt-1 0.711*** −0.5468 0.7325*** −0.9885* 0.6899*** −0.3704***
(18.98) (-1.42) (21.92) (-1.78) (14.36) (-5.14)
Control_variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R 2 0.3872 0.9615 0.4093 0.9631 0.6908 0.9051
VIF 1.08 2.00 1.07 1.57 1.79 1.66
Panel C: ESG-fund score
SRI_dummyt 0.0271*** −0.0332
(5.42) (-1.2)
Overlap_ratiot-1 1.2667*** 0.6964 1.2609*** 1.1862*** 1.5187*** 1.3384***
(36.33) (1.66) (34.74) (2.96) (12.31) (4.2)
ESG_overlapt-1 0.2264*** −0.2642*** 0.2343*** −0.3995*** 0.1788*** −1.3537***
(15.5) (-3.04) (15.27) (-4.61) (3.25) (-7.21)
Control_variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R 2 0.6462 0.8645 0.6629 0.884 0.5818 0.6342
VIF 1.16 2.12 1.17 1.77 1.56 1.64
Table 7
Influence on performance by period. Table 7 shows the overlap and ESG-score influence on performance by period (1 stperiod: 2002–2012, 2nd-period: 2013–2019) for all, conventional,
and SRI funds in panels A–C, respectively. Control-variable results are not displayed and available upon request. T-statistics are in parenthesis. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Panel A: All Panel B: Conventional Panel C: SRI
1 stperiod 2 ndperiod 1 stperiod 2 ndperiod 1 stperiod 2 ndperiod
SRI_dummyt 0.0002 0.0039
(0.74) (1.48)
ESGt-1 −0.0016 −0.0309*** −0.003** −0.0464*** −0.0007 0.0002
(-1.08) (-3.33) (-2.04) (-3.62) (-0.15) (0.08)
Overlap t−1 0.0253*** 0.0012 0.0276*** 0.0366 0.0502*** −0.0176**
(9.32) (0.06) (9.91) (1.29) (4.61) (-1.99)
ESG_overlapt-1 −0.005*** 0.0128*** −0.0047*** 0.0019 0.0008 −0.0083
(-6.72) (2.78) (-5.9) (0.29) (0.17) (-1.66)
Control_variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R 2 0.354 0.9515 0.3559 0.9547 0.6189 0.4409
VIF 1.51 2.09 1.59 1.97 1.89 1.85
significant (the SRI-fund nature does not influence common-stock over-
lapping). However, this dummy remains significantly negative in pan-
els A.2-B.2, reinforcing our prior arguments about the larger imitation
of conventional funds in selecting stocks with greater ESG standards.
Second, the influence of the SRI-nature on ESG-fund scores turns from
positive to non-significant (panels A.3-B.3). These differences indicate
that matched conventional funds are more alike SRI funds and the latter
do not necessarily achieve larger ESG-fund scores; hence, matched-con-
ventional funds are able to develop portfolios with similar ESG stan-
dards to SRI-fund portfolios. Panel B.3 also shows that the SRI-nature
negatively influences performance. Again, comparing more alike con-
ventional and SRI funds, SRI funds achieve lower performance, consis-
tent with the larger constraints of the SRI. Despite these differences,
we find support for our previous results, concluding that conventional
funds are immersed in the ESG-inclusion to attend the evolving values
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Fig. 2. Unmatched versus matched samples. Fig. 2 compares the conventional-fund vari-
ables before (unmatched) and after (matched) applying the nearest-neighbour matching
with the standardised bias across covariates (in percentage).
Table 8
Result comparison with unmatched and matched samples.
Table 8 compares the main results with all (panel A) and matched conventional and
SRI funds (panel B), indicating if the coefficients are significantly-positive(+), signifi-
cantly-negative(−) or non-significant (Non-sig). Differences are grey-shading (panel B).
Panels A.1-B.1 show the results with overlap ratio (3) as dependent variable. Panels
A.2-B.2 show the results with ESG-overlap ratio (5) as dependent variable. Panels A.3-B.3
show the results with ESG-fund score (1) and alpha as dependent variables.
Panel A. All funds
Panel B. Matched conventional
and SRI funds
Panel A.1. Fund-similarity drivers on overlap-
ratio
Panel B.1. Fund-similarity drivers
on overlap-ratio
All Conv SRI All Conv SRI
SRI – Non-sig
ESG + + + + + +
Panel A.2. Fund-similarity drivers on ESG-
overlap
Panel B.2. Fund-similarity drivers
on ESG-overlap
All Conv SRI All Conv SRI
SRI – –
ESG + + + + + +








SRI + Non-sig Non-sig –
Overlap-
ratio
+ + + +
ESG-
overlap
+ – + –
5. Conclusions
This study analyses the mainstream-SRI phenomenon in conven-
tional pension funds, which are increasingly integrating ESG-investment
criteria, as part of a legitimacy process. While SRI funds are specialised
on ESG assets, conventional funds are recent actors in the SRI. We
then examine whether conventional funds consider the firms in which
SRI funds invest to integrate ESG factors. We analyse similarities be-
tween conventional and SRI funds, considering common stocks, portfo-
lio weights, and ESG-stock scores. The mainstream SRI also raises the
need to evaluate whether the mainstream SRI is diverting SRI funds from
ethical purposes.
Our results show that conventional funds present large similarities
to SRI funds on larger ESG-scored investee firms, suggesting that con-
ventional funds consider the SRI-fund holdings to integrate ESG criteria.
Consistent with Hoepner and Schopohl (2020) and legitimacy the-
ory, our evidence shows that pension funds may be adopting a more
holistic interpretation of beneficiaries’ interests, including financial and
non-financial concerns. Additionally, the commonalities between SRI
and conventional funds on superior ESG stocks support the SRI integra-
tion among conventional funds. In line with legitimacy theory, our re-
sults indicate that conventional funds may be following ESG strategies as
mechanism to reach appropriate investments for their relevant publics.
However, SRI funds continue applying larger ESG standards, that is, it
seems that SRI funds desire to maintain their legitimacy and ethical pur-
poses. The mainstream SRI does not appear to be turning SRI as pack-
aged, co-existing a large variety of SRI and conventional funds. Our find-
ings also suggest that the incipient inclusion of ESG criteria by conven-
tional funds was based on benchmarking SRI portfolios, but pioneer con-
ventional funds considering ESG criteria have evolved in the ESG-inte-
gration.
Although our study presents some interesting results, some limita-
tions should be highlighted. The UK possesses the second most im-
portant worldwide pension-fund industry; however, the analysis is re-
stricted to UK domestic equity pension funds, and some results may not
be generalised to other markets. Furthermore, the SRI-fund sample is
reduced due to data limitations (the SRI pension-fund niche is still ex-
panding). It would also be interesting to study other asset classes and
markets. This research will also allow solidifying the sustainability of fi-
nancial markets.
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Appendix.
Table A.1
Results with nearest-neighbour matching. Panels A–B show the results with overlap
(3) and ESG-overlap (5) ratios as dependent variables. Panel C shows the results with
ESG-fund score (1) as dependent variable for matched conventional and SRI funds. Panel
D shows the results with alpha as dependent variable for matched conventional and SRI
funds (estimations 1–4), matched conventional (5), and SRI funds (estimation 6). Panel
E shows the results including controversial-sector holdings to analyse their influence on
the performance of matched conventional and SRI funds, matched conventional, and SRI
funds. All models are estimated with OLS, robust standard errors, and clustered by fund
and month. Control-variable results are not displayed and available upon request. T-statis-
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(12.94) (14.36) (8.75) (26.04) (25.46)
R 2 0.4201 0.612 0.4736 0.5787 0.665
VIF 1.46 1.73 1.79 1.46 1.73
Panel C: Similarity influence on ESG-fund score
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SRI_dummyt 0.0046 −0.0064 0.0176** 0.0085
(0.44) (-0.67) (2.02) (0.96)
Overlap_ratiot-1 1.1702*** 0.565***
(12.93) (6.31)
ESG_overlap t-1 0.6301*** 0.5133***
(15.45) (10.42)
Constantt 0.3354*** −0.3381*** −0.3422*** −0.5258***
(2.75) (-4.51) (-3) (-5.54)
R 2 0.101 0.333 0.4767 0.5155
VIF 1.24 1.28 1.24 1.35
Panel D: Similarity influence on performance






−0.0018*** −0.002*** −0.0019*** −0.0022***
(-3.36) (-3.79) (-3.59) (-4.28)
ESGt-1 0.005*** 0.0001 0.0075*** 0.0042 0.0037 −0.0005
(2.63) (0.02) (2.61) (1.53) (1.27) (-0.11)
Overlap
t-1
0.0234*** 0.0274*** 0.0439*** 0.0484***




−0.0035 −0.0073** −0.011** 0.0006
(-1.14) (-2.32) (-2.52) (0.13)
R 2 0.2835 0.3148 0.2872 0.3253 0.3968 0.6132
VIF 1.27 1.4 1.5 1.61 2.01 1.89




ESGt-1 0.0034 0.0118*** 0.0087**
(1.32) (3.93) (2.25)
Tobaccot-1 0.0397*** −0.0332 0.0225**
(3.73) (-1.45) (2.05)
Gamblingt-1 −0.1395*** −0.147*** −0.1722**
(-3.68) (-3.36) (-2.31)
Alcoholt-1 −0.0329*** −0.0602*** −0.0077
(-3.11) (-2.93) (-0.46)
Constantt 0.0142*** 0.022*** 0.0025
(4.16) (4.8) (1.02)
R 2 0.3495 0.4047 0.5912
VIF 1.68 2.17 2.18
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